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INTRODUCTION 
There is a conventional narrative surrounding the term 
“exclusionary zoning.”  It describes a particular phenomenon: a 
suburb adopting large-lot zoning or other density controls that reduce 
the supply of developable land, thereby driving up prices and making 
housing unaffordable for lower-income households.1  This 
phenomenon, in turn, generates a set of familiar worries about 
municipalities not bearing their fair share of lower-income 
households and imposing the associated costs on their neighbors and 
 
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.  Thanks to Nestor Davidson for steering 
us towards this topic. Thanks also to Nicole Tarpey and Ben Stark for early 
discussions about the piece. 
** J.D., Brooklyn Law School (2013); M.S., City and Regional Planning, Pratt 
Institute (Expected 2014). 
 1. See, e.g., Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of 
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 861 (2010) 
(characterizing exclusionary zoning as a problem of suburban land use controls). 
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in particular on the urban core.2  This relatively parochial frame, 
however, misses some of the scales at which exclusion operates, and 
therefore the forms that exclusionary zoning sometimes takes.  
Expanding the frame reveals problems of exclusion not just at the 
local level, but at the regional and sub-local levels as well.  
Exclusionary zoning in its modern form is no longer limited to low-
density suburbs, but now occurs also within the urban core and 
region-wide. 
Most responses to exclusionary zoning operate only on the local 
scale to address the exclusion of lower-income households from 
suburban municipalities.3  Most famously, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, required municipalities to bear their fair share of 
affordable housing need.4  New Jersey’s legislative response has 
similarly focused on local governments’ fair share obligations.5  Other 
states also have a local focus.6  Massachusetts, for example, gives 
developers an exemption from local zoning if a municipality does not 
meet a pre-determined affordable housing quota.7 
These are appropriate responses to the conventional concern of 
exclusionary zoning, which consists of a local government using 
particular zoning techniques to force lower-income households into 
neighboring municipalities.  These tactics benefit the excluding 
government’s tax rolls to the detriment of its neighbors.  But an 
exclusive focus on municipal-level exclusionary zoning misses other 
important problems, namely: access by lower-income households to 
public services and higher wages. 
In contrast to the traditional focus on inter-local externalities, we 
argue here that the problem of exclusionary zoning should be viewed 
first and foremost from the perspective of lower-income households.8  
 
 2. See generally S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 
713 (N.J. 1975). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 28–31. 
 4. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d at 731–32. 
 5. See, e.g., Mallach, supra note 1, at 850 (discussing the legislation establishing 
New Jersey’s Council on Affordable Housing, the state agency tasked with 
monitoring local government compliance with fair share obligations). 
 6. See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING, AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (2003) (describing the fair share 
approaches adopted in New Jersey, California, Oregon and New Hampshire). 
 7. Massachusetts Low and Middle Income Housing Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40B, §§ 20–23 (2002). 
 8. See, e.g., Norman Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 345 (1955).  Williams divides the problem of exclusionary 
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As a group, they have needs at different geographical scales.  They 
need access to regions where employment opportunities are available 
and wages are high relative to costs of living.  They need access to 
municipalities that offer an attractive mix of services and taxation.  
And they need housing opportunities in specific neighborhoods that 
are not isolated from core public services.  Exclusionary zoning can 
operate in each of these spatial frames independently of one another. 
The long-standing focus of exclusionary zoning on the content of local 
ordinances, instead of on these broader exclusionary dynamics, has 
defined the problem of exclusionary zoning too narrowly.  We aim to 
remedy that deficiency in our contribution to the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal’s Fortieth Anniversary issue. 
In Part I we describe traditional accounts of exclusionary zoning.  
In Part II, we explore the different geographical scales at which 
exclusion can operate and the varied forms exclusion can take.  
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the need for more finely-tuned judicial 
interventions to comprehensively address exclusion in its many forms. 
I.  THE LOCAL FOCUS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Contemporary concerns about exclusionary zoning are intimately 
bound up with Twentieth Century suburbanization.9  In the 1940s, 
middle- and upper-income households increasingly took advantage of 
improvements in transportation infrastructure to build and buy 
houses farther and farther outside the urban core.10  Simultaneously, 
those newly developing suburbs enacted restrictive zoning ordinances 
that excluded or limited affordable housing options for lower-income 
households.11 
 
zoning into two key components—the improper burden shifting among local 
governments and the relegation of lower-income groups to “slum housing.” Id.  
Williams’ overarching premise is that various forms of exclusion limit spontaneous 
contact across racial, ethnic, and economic lines, harming our system of democratic 
government. Id. at 348. 
 9. Suburbanization does not refer to only one phenomenon. See Wayne Batchis, 
Suburbanization and Constitutional Interpretation: Exclusionary Zoning and the 
Supreme Court Legacy of Enabling Sprawl, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7 (2012) (“Over 
the course of American history, the meaning of ‘urban’ and ‘suburban’ have shifted 
in accordance with technological capacity and social proclivities.”). 
 10. See id. at 18–20 (describing post-war suburbanization).  Some scholars have 
observed how the proliferation of exclusionary devices tracked the expansion of the 
interstate highway system. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of 
Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effect, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319 (2004). 
 11. See James C. Quinn, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent 
Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 147 (1975) (noting 
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In addition to blatant discrimination, there are fiscal reasons for 
exclusionary zoning that are easily observable and well developed in 
the academic literature.12  Where public services are funded in 
significant part by property taxes, owners of lower-valued housing 
contribute less to those services, receiving an implicit subsidy from 
owners of higher valued property.13  The effect is exacerbated if 
owners of lower-valued property also “consume” more than the 
average amount of public services by, for example, having more 
children in the public school.  The availability of lower-valued 
property in a municipality can therefore present tough choices to 
existing property owners: either pay more in property taxes, or accept 
cutbacks in the level of public services.14  Neither is very appealing, so 
existing property owners have a significant incentive to use “fiscal 
zoning” to keep out owners of lower-valued property in order to 
minimize, if not eliminate, the extent of the cross-subsidy from 
owners of higher-valued to owners of lower-valued property.15 
 
how municipalities facing suburban development pressures were most likely to adopt 
exclusionary devices to preserve neighborhood character, and keep taxes and 
demand for municipal services at low levels). 
 12. See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: 
Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 15 (Edwin 
S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Rolf Pendall et al., Connecting Smart 
Growth, Housing Affordability and Racial Equity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 229–30 
(Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (noting positive justifications for zoning with 
“exclusionary or expulsive impacts”); Henry A. Span, How Courts Should Fight 
Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 18 (2001) (describing how 
exclusionary zoning aligns taxes and services with preferences of residents).  For an 
example of uncommon candor about fiscal concerns, see S. Burlington Cnty NAACP 
v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (1975) (acknowledging purpose of 
exclusionary zoning to protect the local tax base). 
 13. Span, supra note 12, at 18–19 (describing fiscal zoning, which can produce 
exclusionary outcomes as residents attempt to limit entry to those “who will pay 
more in property taxes than they will consume in municipal services”). 
 14. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-
USE POLICIES (2001). 
 15. While this traditional account of exclusionary zoning is focused primarily on 
the relationship between exclusionary devices and the preservation of property 
values, scholars have also highlighted the preservation of neighborhood character as 
an underlying motivation for exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Tight 
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 767, 797 (1969).  Neighborhood character, however, is an ambiguous 
motivation, and as legal scholar Norman Williams Jr. pointed out, it may be “merely 
another way of [residents] saying . . . they want economic segregation.” Williams, 
supra note 8, at 344; see also Stephen Sussna, Residential Densities: A Patchwork 
Placebo, 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127, 133–34 (1972) (detailing the many justifications 
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Early writing in this journal described the tangible impacts that 
resulted from this appetite for exclusionary devices.16  Large-lot 
zoning was ubiquitous across suburbs that developed around major 
cities like New York and Saint Louis.17  In fact, in the late 1960s, 
Missouri had a four-year supply of one-third acre lots, but a stunning 
350-year supply of one-acre lots.18  These figures reflect an obvious 
and significant barrier to new affordable housing development during 
that period. 
To make matters worse, the political calculation tends to be 
weighted strongly against affordable housing.  The burden of housing 
price increases is felt primarily by people who are excluded from the 
municipality—people who are prevented from ever moving in the 
first place, or who are forced to move out because they cannot afford 
higher rents.  Neither constituency is likely to have much political 
influence,19 and the former is unlikely even to self-identify as a 
constituency.  Therefore, local politicians’ incentives tend to be 
dominated in these matters by the interests of local homeowners, who 
are primarily concerned with maximizing local property values.20 
These dynamics led to obvious and predictable outcomes 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  People who could 
afford to do so began leaving cities en masse, increasing property 
values and the tax base in suburbs while relegating an increasingly 
poor population to the inner cities.21  This “white flight” had a 
pernicious racial aspect, segregating cities and suburbs into minority 
 
for exclusionary zoning, including the aesthetic preferences for large lots that drove 
many Americans to leave urban areas).  Some state courts have rejected the 
preservation of neighborhood character as a basis for restrictive land use controls. 
See generally Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward 
Exclusionary Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229 (2003) (describing how state courts evaluate community 
character justifications, and providing recommendations for when such justifications 
should be categorically rejected). 
 16. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 147–48; Sussna, supra note 15, at 134. 
 17. Sussna, supra note 15, at 132 (citing Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal 
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645, 1645 n.5 (1971)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE. L.J. 385, 402 (1977). 
 20. FISCHEL, supra note 14. 
 21. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 
735–36 (N.J. 1975) (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE 
AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34 (1968)). 
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and white populations respectively.22  Cities then faced the dual 
pressures of a declining tax base and increased demand on public 
services.23  In the competition between cities and suburbs, 
exclusionary zoning was a powerful tool to protect the suburban tax 
base and keep cities poor. 
Affordable housing, in this view, presents a kind of NIMBY (Not 
in My Backyard) problem.  Every region needs some low-wage 
workers—whether in service, manufacturing, or government sectors 
of the regional economy—but no particular municipality wants to 
house them.  Likewise, every region has a dependent population that 
requires some government support, but every municipality would 
rather it be provided somewhere else.  As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court therefore recognized in Mt. Laurel, exclusionary zoning creates 
a kind of inter-local externality, imposing costs on neighboring 
communities forced to house a disproportionate share of lower-
income households.24  For example, Mount Laurel’s exclusionary 
zoning was primarily to the detriment of Philadelphia, Camden and 
Trenton, the nearby urban centers.25  But that same dynamic has 
played out throughout the country, with suburbs enacting 
exclusionary zoning ordinances that impose the costs of lower-income 
households on to the urban core. 
When people think or write about exclusionary zoning, then, they 
often have this form of inter-local competition at least implicitly in 
mind: suburbs using large-lot zoning and other density controls to 
 
 22. See, e.g., Scott J. South & Kyle D. Crowder, Escaping Distressed 
Neighborhoods: Individual, Community, and Metropolitan Influences, 102 AM. J. 
SOC. 1040 (1997) (explaining concurrent dynamics fueling racial segregation including 
the difficulty racial minorities face exiting ghettos, and their ease of entry into 
ghettos); Sussna, supra note 15, at 131 (describing “two distinct racial societies . . . 
dangerously developing in the United States” as mostly white families fled urban 
areas and percentage of blacks increased). 
 23. See ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR 
AMERICA 9–10 (1973) (describing how older, more affordable housing remained in 
“central cities and some close-in suburbs,” which compelled “thousands of such 
households to become concentrated in the worst urban housing”). 
 24. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727–28 (“[T]he universal and constant need for such 
housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare 
which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond 
their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the 
particular municipality.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Linda H. Jones, Note, The Mount Laurel Case: A Question of 
Remedies, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 442, 443 (1975) (“Because of Mount Laurel’s proximity 
to the urban centers of Camden, Trenton and Philadelphia, it is a likely place for 
growth and for immigration from the nearby overcrowded urban centers.”). 
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prevent affordable housing options, forcing lower-income households 
to remain in the urban core.26  As a result, zoning ordinances 
identified as “exclusionary” usually involve municipalities limiting 
density and increasing infrastructure costs, either directly or 
indirectly.27 
What is often missing from the debates and discussion, however, is 
recognition that exclusion happens at different geographical scales.  
Regional and sub-local exclusion may be just as problematic as 
exclusion at the municipal level. 
II.  THE SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Most writing and theorizing about the problem of exclusionary 
zoning focuses on the geographic scale of the municipality or relevant 
zoning authority.28 At first blush, this seems obviously “correct” 
because responsibility for exclusionary zoning lies with the 
government that enacted the zoning ordinance.  Moreover, 
exclusionary zoning’s role in inter-local competition makes local 
governments seem like the appropriate scale for analysis because 
property taxes are collected and many public services—like schools—
are provided at the local level.29  The traditional concern, after all, is 
with one local government avoiding its fair share of the costs of 
lower-income households to the detriment of other municipalities. 
The local focus is due in part to the fact that the most successful 
legal challenges to exclusionary zoning have relied on this theory of 
inter-local externalities and the unreasonable application of state 
police power.30  In contrast, federal constitutional challenges by 
 
 26. In some cases, large lot zoning did not originate as an exclusionary device, but 
rather, was a counter-response to the speculative real estate markets of the 1920s, 
when far too many small lots were created. See Sussna, supra note 15, at 134. 
 27. See Quinn, supra note 11, at 148 n.9 (providing examples of common 
exclusionary devices including minimum lot sizes and widths, exclusion of multi-
family housing, restrictions on number of bedrooms in apartment developments, and 
prohibitions on mobile homes). 
 28. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce 
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888–89 
(2006) (describing exclusionary zoning as a problem originating with municipality, 
using delegated powers to “serve only the perceived interest of that locality, without 
consideration of the effect of their laws on the larger region”). 
 29. But see generally Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case 
for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing regional 
services and amenities). 
 30. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d. 492, 495–96 (N.H. 1991) (relying on 
“general welfare clause” of New Hampshire’s zoning enabling statute to invalidate 
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excluded residents, based on equal protection or access to housing, 
have been largely unsuccessful.31  As a result, the spatial inquiry is 
regularly confined to individual municipalities and inter-local 
affordable housing burdens, rather than the experience of exclusion 
by lower-income households at various scales.  The question of scale, 
however, is far less straightforward than it appears.  When it comes to 
affordable housing options, a lower-income household may be 
relatively indifferent to local jurisdictional boundaries (subject to 
some caveats, examined below).  The question for the household is 
simply whether there are affordable housing options in a safe 
neighborhood with appropriate access to basic needs (jobs, schools, 
services, medical care, and so forth).  According to one account, the 
focus should be on a broader “geography of advantage and 
disadvantage: dangerous streets and safe ones, good schools and 
failing ones.”32  Zoning is exclusionary to the extent that it limits or 
eliminates such housing options.  Judged by this broader criterion, the 
problem of exclusionary zoning can occur at both the sub-local and 
the regional level. 
A. The Needs of Lower-Income Households 
Traditional exclusionary zoning—as practiced at the municipal 
level—is not the only form of residential exclusion.  At the regional 
level, lower-income households need the ability to move to 
 
town’s large-lot zoning that served parochial interests of residents rather than 
broader concerns); S. Burlington Cnty. NACP v. Twp. Of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 
713, 713 (N.J. 1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 
1975) (setting out two-part test for exclusionary zoning challenges, including whether 
the ordinance gives due consideration “to regional needs and requirements”); Twp. 
of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975) (striking down ordinance 
providing limited apartment development for failure to accommodate fair share of 
multi-family development in the township). 
 31. See, e.g., Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(rejecting “poverty” as a basis for suspect classification). 
 32. Matthew Desmond & Tracey Shollenberger, Mechanisms of Neighborhood 
Selection: Why and How Poor Families Move 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors).  This “residential attainment model” is one of several frameworks for 
understanding the motivations underlying the spatial locations of lower-income 
households. Id. (manuscript at 2–3).  Here, moves from one locale to another are 
driven by a desire for economic gains.  Traditionally, this has taken the form of 
minority and immigrant communities moving from urban areas to working class 
neighborhoods, and ultimately to suburban communities. Id. (manuscript at 2–3) 
(citing John R. Logan & Richard D. Alba, Locational Returns to Human Capital: 
Minority Access to Suburban Community Resources, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 243, 244 
(1993)). 
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employment opportunities.33  Regional economies grow and stagnate.  
In one decade, Detroit may be an engine of growth, another New 
York or Nashville.34  It is important—for workers as well as for the 
economy—that people be able to move to where the money and jobs 
are, with limited barriers to entry.35  Such mobility decreases wage 
differentials between regions, provides labor in places where jobs are 
relatively plentiful and workers are needed, and offers a way up the 
economic ladder for lower-income workers.36 
There is, however, some evidence that inter-regional mobility is on 
the decline, and some further evidence that one cause may be land 
use controls—particularly land use controls enacted in higher-income 
states.37  This is troubling as an economic phenomenon, and also poses 
significant challenges to lower-income workers who may be unable to 
access regions with higher wages.  As a result, regional income 
convergence has slowed, due at least in part to residential restrictions 
limiting access to these more economically vibrant parts of the 
country.38 
But the problem of exclusion operates at the sub-local level as well.  
Zoning, after all, can be used to protect well-to-do neighborhoods 
and segregate lower-income households in discrete pockets within a 
given municipality.  The phenomenon is widespread.39  The 
 
 33. Ann R. Tickamyer & Cynthia M. Duncan, Poverty and Opportunity Structure 
in Rural America, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 67, 79–81 (1990) (linking rural poverty to 
limited opportunities for out-migration). 
 34. See Kim Severson, Nashville’s Latest Big Hit Could Be the City Itself, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at A11. 
 35. See generally Davidson & Foster, supra note 29; Peter Ganong & Daniel 
Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Stopped?  (Harvard 
Kennedy School Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2081216. 
 36. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 2; see also ANDREW J. OSWALD, A 
CONJECTURE ON THE EXPLANATION FOR HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS: PART I (1996) (linking the mobility constraints associated 
with growing homeownership rates to increased unemployment across western 
economies); Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of 
Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 334–36 (1999) (explaining how 
limited mobility of poorer communities reduced access to jobs as positions moved to 
the “ever-extending periphery of the metropolitan region”). 
 37. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 27 (“[T]ighter [land use] regulations 
impede population flows to rich areas and weaken convergence in human capital.”). 
 38. Id.; cf. Span, supra note 12, at 19 (discussing the effect of traditional 
exclusionary zoning as “isolat[ing] from employment those excluded from the 
suburbs”). 
 39. Common interest communities, too, sometimes use fine-grained private land 
use controls in their master deeds to exclude lower-income households.  While this is 
SERKIN-WELLINGTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2013  5:32 PM 
1676 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
revitalization of many cities from the 1980s through today is 
characterized by increased power of individual communities retaking 
control over zoning, services, and spending at the sub-local level in 
order to break the downward spiral of the city more broadly that 
characterized the previous decades.40  By asserting sub-local control 
over services and even, in some cases, revenue (through TIFs, special 
assessments, and the like), well-to-do neighborhoods within a 
municipality can benefit by excluding lower-income households.  But 
this creates some of the same NIMBY pressure between 
neighborhoods that exist between local governments, and many 
neighborhoods have managed to secure zoning protection to prevent 
new affordable development, either by asserting formal land use 
authority at the sub-local level, or by successfully petitioning the local 
zoning authority.41 
Viewed exclusively through the lens of inter-local competition, sub-
local exclusionary zoning should be of no concern.  It does not matter 
where municipalities provide housing for lower-income households, 
so long as they accommodate their fair share.  But this misses at least 
some of the point.  The ultimate goal is not—or at least is not 
 
not typically viewed through the lens of exclusionary zoning, the effect in some 
municipalities may well be to force lower-income households into very limited 
housing options, with access to a public school and public services that are severely 
underfunded relative to the common interest communities. See Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 
442–43 (2006). 
 40. This has happened both formally and informally.  Homeowners’ associations 
amount to a kind of reclaiming of sub-local regulatory power.  TIFs allow sub-local 
communities to capture increased property tax revenue and divert it away from the 
broader municipality.  Less formally, too, city councils have become more responsive 
to neighborhood demands, like downzoning built-out communities, which can limit 
development potential.  For theoretical proposals supporting these changes, see 
generally Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace 
Zoning With Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827 (1999). 
 41. Examples of sub-local land use control do not always involve zoning, but can 
have the very same exclusionary effect.  A leading example is the creation of 
neighborhood conservation districts, which create the veto power of historic 
preservation without the need for any historic significance. See generally William A. 
Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339 (2013); see also 
Desmond & Shollenberger, supra note 32, (manuscript at 7) (explaining how even 
incremental moves from one block to another can mean the difference between total 
exclusion from community resources and capital to new opportunities for 
advancement).  The “considerable diversity of neighborhood context among the 
urban poor,” suggests that sub-local inquiries are integral to the understanding of the 
true sources upward mobility. Desmond & Shollenberger, supra note 32, (manuscript 
at 7). 
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exclusively—inter-municipal fairness for local governments’ budgets, 
but must also include positive outcomes for the region’s (and the 
nation’s) lower-income households.  Preventing traditional 
exclusionary zoning at the municipal level can be important for 
achieving this goal because it pushes back against ghettoization in the 
urban core and the reduced public services available to households 
that may need them the most.  It is not, however, a panacea.  Even if 
local governments all bear their fair share of lower-income 
households, those households may fare no better if they are then 
segregated by municipal governments into sub-local slums and 
provided with lower quality services.42  Importantly, then, 
exclusionary zoning is not just the pernicious tool of suburbs in their 
competition with the urban core (and each other), but also exists 
within cities and larger municipalities.  A city’s zoning can be 
exclusionary when it protects well-to-do neighborhoods, and limits 
housing for lower-income households. 
Stepping back, then, the problem of exclusion replicates itself at 
different scales.  At the largest scale, it is concerned with the 
distribution of lower-income households across the nation.  At the 
middle (traditional) scale, it is concerned with their distribution 
within a region.  And at the smallest scale, it is concerned with the 
distribution of lower-income households at the neighborhood or even 
the block or building level. 
B. The Problem of Exclusion Reassessed 
With this more comprehensive spatial frame comes some 
important insights and legal conclusions—described below—but also 
some new conceptual hurdles.  It is simply not true, for instance, that 
people should be able to live wherever they want.  Problematizing 
exclusion across spatial frames does not mean that Silicon Valley 
should house a large share of the nation’s poor, nor that Park Avenue 
or Beverly Hills should have a significant portion of their housing 
stock dedicated to New York’s or Los Angeles’s lower-income 
households.  So how should exclusion be assessed? 
The traditional focus on municipal exclusionary zoning contains 
the seeds of an answer.  In this account, zoning is a mechanism that 
 
 42. Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 11 (1997) (“Location of households and individuals in 
segregated, poverty-stricken neighborhoods significantly influences the quality of 
their schools, the level of municipal services, tax burdens, access to work, and level of 
safety.”). 
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well-to-do suburbs can use to limit the subsidy from owners of higher-
valued property to owners of lower-valued property.43  As outlined 
above, local government actors generally seek to maximize local 
property values, which requires maximizing the value of the public 
services they offer—schools, infrastructure, etc.—while minimizing 
property taxes.  One way that a lower-income household can improve 
its situation is by moving to a municipality with better public services, 
at least so long as those public services are not fully reflected in that 
household’s housing costs (including property taxes).  A lower-
income household can benefit by buying lower-valued property in a 
municipality offering higher-valued services.44  Exclusionary zoning is 
problematic from the perspective of lower-income households, then, 
if it constrains supply to an extent that the value of public services are 
largely capitalized into housing costs. 
Some might object that this is not a problem with zoning but, 
instead, its most salutary feature.  It goes some way to converting 
local property taxes into user fees, offering the slate of services only 
to those families willing and able to pay.  By narrowing the range of 
local property values, it narrows the subsidy available to people at the 
lower end of that band.45  For purposes of this short Essay, we do not 
set out to defend any one view of government, but simply assume that 
local governments rely on property taxes instead of user fees partly 
because some measure of redistribution is desirable.  It is fair to ask 
owners of more expensive property to bear a greater share of the 
costs of public services, and it is appropriate for owners of lower-
valued property to receive a kind of subsidy for the services they 
consume. 
We take no view here on the extent of subsidy that is normatively, 
politically, or economically desirable.  Constraining that subsidy to 
some extent is clearly appropriate and is an important consequence if 
not function of municipal land use controls.  But those constraints can 
 
 43. Exclusionary zoning is traditionally discussed in terms of minimum lot 
requirements, crafted to create economically homogenous suburban communities.  
See, e.g., Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme 
Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS 
L.J. 513, 531 (1984) (presenting large-lot zoning as the dominant form of residential 
exclusion). 
 44. See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 15 (describing how local governments 
institute restrictive zoning to avoid dynamic of “musical suburbs,” where lower-
income households move to more affluent neighborhoods to access fiscal advantages 
like better quality public services). 
 45. Id. at 13 (noting how homogeneous housing values promote economic 
efficiency). 
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go too far.  Zoning is exclusionary when it crosses that line—
wherever it is drawn. 
The important point for this Essay is that exclusionary outcomes 
can repeat at the regional and sub-local levels as well.  For a lower-
income household, accessing a municipality with good public services 
is no help if those services are not available to everyone in the 
community.  The good schools may only be available to children in 
wealthy neighborhoods, for example; police may provide different 
levels of protection, and investments in public infrastructure may be 
different as well.46  To the extent the value of these services is fully 
capitalized into the cost of housing, there is little meaningful access 
for lower-income households. 
If this discussion seems esoteric, consider public schools.  Anyone 
who has shopped for a house knows that the quality of the zoned 
public school translates into higher home values.  If the “full” value of 
that school is reflected in property values, then it provides little actual 
access for lower-income households.  In fact, school districting is 
often hard-fought.47  True, even the most desirable public schools 
often draw from some less expensive neighborhoods, but the issue is 
how many affordable housing options are actually available.  Too 
many options, of course, and the quality of the school may decrease, 
but with too few, the school district starts to look inappropriately 
exclusionary.  Again, our purpose in this Essay is not to suggest where 
that line is drawn but is simply to recognize the dynamic of sub-local 
exclusion. 
It is possible that sub-local exclusionary zoning is less problematic 
than municipal exclusionary zoning if all residents are, in fact, able to 
access municipal services equally.  A suburb that has only one public 
school will not be able to zone out lower-income residents from that 
school, but in larger jurisdictions and urban areas the opportunity for 
sub-local exclusion clearly exists.  Indeed, the cycle of poor services 
and low property values is replicated at the sub-local level in many 
cities.  In New York City, parents are well aware of the 
 
 46. There are other legal doctrines that prohibit discrimination in the provision of 
local services, but they are often weakly enforced. See, e.g., Mount Prospect State 
Bank v. Vill. of Kirkland, 467 N.E.2d 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), cited in LYNN A. 
BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (4th ed. 2010) 
(reproducing case in a discussion of discrimination in public services). 
 47. See, e.g., Benjamin Zimmer, A Deregulatory Framework for Alleviating 
Concentrated African-American Poverty, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 555, 569 
(2012) (detailing “[the] strong incentive for residents in any school district to 
preclude the development of housing of lower value than their own”). 
SERKIN-WELLINGTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2013  5:32 PM 
1680 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
neighborhoods with “good” schools and, at least in the last few years, 
the Bloomberg administration has used its zoning power aggressively 
to maintain property values in those more affluent parts of the city.48  
Residents of a subsidized housing development may be able to send 
their children to the same public school and access the same police 
protection as residents in the wealthy parts of town.  But maybe not.  
It depends entirely on the municipality and how services are 
distributed within its borders. 
Political pressure at the sub-local level may increase the likelihood 
of sub-local exclusion.49  Wealthy neighborhoods may exercise 
disproportionate power on the local zoning authority and seek to 
preserve property values, severely curtailing affordability.  They may 
also fight to keep school zone boundaries tightly correlated to 
neighborhood affluence.50  And, even when a municipality is 
committed to equalizing public expenditures across schools, active 
parent involvement in fundraising—often through PTAs—can 
dramatically affect the relative resources of different schools in the 
same jurisdiction.51 
If a municipality has the ability—formally or informally—to 
discriminate between neighborhoods in the provision of services, then 
sub-local exclusionary zoning implicates problems that are very 
similar to traditional exclusionary zoning at the municipal level.  Both 
 
 48. See AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL., HOW HAVE RECENT REZONINGS AFFECTED 
THE CITY’S ABILITY TO GROW? 10 (2010), available at 
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Rezonings_Furman_Center_Policy_Brief_
March_2010.pdf (“[U]pzoned lots were located in areas with significantly lower 
income than the City median . . . .”).  This happens internationally, too, and often 
with pernicious effects.  In Romania, many Roma (gypsies), live in discrete 
communities and are provided their own schools so as not to “burden” public 
schools.  This is sub-local exclusion, and the results are little different than if they 
were forced to live in their own towns.  For a compelling account, see OUR SCHOOL 
(Sat Mic Films, 2011). 
 49. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1699–1705 (2013) 
(offering account of local political dynamics that identifies sublocal pressures). 
 50. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding Metro 
Nashville Rezoning Plan, which was challenged on grounds that it perpetuated 
“racially isolated geographical zones” by aligning school districts with neighborhood 
boundaries, rather than using non-contiguous zones to foster more integrated 
districts). 
 51. PTAs in high-income New York City neighborhoods like the Upper West 
Side of Manhattan regularly raise almost one million dollars per year for the local 
public elementary school, allowing the school to support a range of enrichment 
programs unavailable to schools with a less affluent base of parents. See Kyle 
Spencer, Way Beyond Bake Sales: The $1 Million PTA, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at 
MB1. 
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raise the specter of isolating lower-income families and providing 
them with fewer services, adversely impacting household outcomes. 
Less obviously, a similar dynamic also exists at the regional level, 
although the focus is on wages rather than on the mix of public 
services and property taxes.  Employment opportunities are not 
evenly distributed across the country, and the same is true of higher-
wage jobs.52  Even if every local government accommodates a 
proportionate share of the region’s lower-income households, the 
region as a whole may not bear a fair share of the nation’s lower-
income households.  And that simply replicates the conventional 
exclusionary zoning problem at the regional level, where wealthy 
regions—primarily on the coasts—are able to use regulatory burdens 
to limit affordability.53  This, in turn, means that an increased number 
of lower-income households remain where they are (primarily in the 
South and Midwest), contributing less to the regional tax base and 
straining public infrastructure. 
 Ganong and Shoag provide one useful way for thinking about 
regional exclusion.54  They examine the extent to which housing prices 
capitalize inter-regional wage differentials.  In their account, one 
common path towards economic improvement for a lower-income 
household is to move from a lower-wage to higher-wage region.55  
Residential mobility in this country has largely fit this pattern, with 
higher-wage regions exerting a kind of gravitational pull for people 
seeking higher-paying jobs.56  But that pull exists only to the extent 
that the wage differential is not fully capitalized into local property 
values.57  If someone can achieve an additional $10,000 in annual 
wages by moving from Alabama to New York City, but has to pay an 
additional $10,000 in housing costs, then the value of the move is a 
wash. 
 
 52. Tickamyer & Duncan, supra note 33, at 81 (1990) (detailing the 
disproportionate amount of low-wage jobs in rural communities). 
 53. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building 
Restrictions on Housing Affordability 3–6 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 1948, 2002) (explaining that the coasts are the primary areas 
where housing prices far exceed construction costs, and attributing that gap to zoning 
and its artificial constraint on new construction). 
 54. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 2–3 (explaining that historically, workers of all skill levels moved to 
areas with high nominal incomes). 
 57. Id. (linking escalating housing prices in productive places to the movement of 
lower-skilled workers to areas with “low nominal income but high real income net of 
housing costs”). 
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According to Ganong and Shoag, the increased capitalization of 
wage differentials in housing prices makes it more difficult for 
workers to move up the economic ladder.58  It discourages residential 
mobility and increases income inequality.  And, importantly, it is due 
in no small part—according to their paper—to the proliferation of 
land use regulations in higher-wage jurisdictions.59  Regional 
exclusionary zoning, then, is characterized by housing prices that 
capitalize all or most of the relatively higher wages. 
C. Modern Forms of Exclusion 
Recognizing that residential exclusion occurs not only at a local 
scale, but also at sub-local and regional scales, reveals surprising 
variety in the forms that exclusion can take.  Traditional exclusionary 
zoning at the local scale consists, generally, of large-lot zoning in 
outer-ring suburbs.  By restricting density and constraining the supply 
of developable land, suburbs can boost local land values, translating 
directly into higher housing prices.  When these conventional land use 
controls are found to be impermissibly exclusionary, the intuitive 
response is to call for more density. 
But once the problem of exclusionary zoning is reframed using 
different geographical scales, density is no longer a universal solution.  
For instance, in neighborhoods experiencing a growing demand for 
urban living, increased density may be leading to sub-local 
exclusionary outcomes.  The forms of exclusion identified below are 
by no means comprehensive, but they nevertheless suggest the 
breadth of the forms that modern exclusionary zoning can take when 
sub-local and regional effects are included. 
There is a sense in which zoning is always and inherently 
exclusionary.  To the extent it restricts supply—and that, after all, is 
what zoning primarily does—it should have the effect of increasing 
prices, at least as compared to the alternative of no density controls.60  
But that is not quite right, because consumer preferences for different 
levels of density will also affect property values, and may affect them 
quite dramatically.61  Much of the writing on exclusionary zoning is 
premised at least implicitly on a relatively static and familiar view of 
 
 58. Id. at 27. 
 59. Id. (“Though there has been a dramatic decline in income convergence 
nationally, places that remain unconstrained by land use regulation continue to 
converge at similar rates.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 53, at 5–6. 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 70–76. 
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consumer preferences.62  All things being equal, people will prefer to 
live in single-family homes with plenty of land.  More land, in this 
view, is always better and more valuable than less land.  Density 
restrictions that require more land per house are therefore catering to 
consumer preferences at the same time that they are reducing the 
supply of developable land.  But there are signs that consumer 
preferences are changing, at least in certain markets.  The aging 
population in the U.S. may well be driving some of these shifting 
preferences.63  Younger populations are increasingly leaving suburbs 
where older populations (ages forty-five and above) are heavily 
represented.64  As a result, aging suburbs are experiencing slow 
growth, or in some cases declines in their younger populations.65  On 
the whole, suburbs are aging at a faster rate than cities, posing 
broader questions about how to keep older and more established 
suburbs relevant.66 
Moreover, the resurgence of cities and the rise of New Urbanist 
designs suggest that at least a segment of the population actually 
prefers greater density.67  Recently, cities like Las Vegas, Raleigh, and 
Charlotte are seeing sharp gains in their younger populations.68  
Examining the population as a whole between July 2010 and July 
 
 62. See, e.g., Lehmann, supra note 15, at 230–31 (noting how wealthy households 
tend to build “single-family homes on expensive multi-acre plots of land,” while 
central cities disproportionately house lower-income families). 
 63. See WILLIAM H. FREY, THE UNEVEN AGING AND ‘YOUNGING’ OF AMERICA: 
STATE AND METROPOLITAN TRENDS IN THE 2010 CENSUS 7–8 (2011) (describing 
“aging in place” phenomenon, where seniors continue to reside in same post-war 
suburbs they first settled with young families). 
 64. Id. at 11, 13. 
 65. Id. at 16–17. 
 66. Id. at 10–11. 
 67. See, e.g., Alan Ehrenhalt, Trading Places—The Demographic Inversion of the 
American City, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2008, at 2–4 (detailing difficulties of 
retaining urban middle class, and high costs associated with luxury urbanism). 
 68. FREY, supra note 63, at 14.  However, the low national growth rate for people 
below the age of forty-five, coupled with outmigration of young adult families and 
children, have caused cities to experience greater declines in their younger 
populations than suburbs between 2000 and 2010. See id. at 13–14; see also Kyle Fee 
& Daniel Hartle, Growing Cities, Shrinking Cities, FED. RES. BANK CLEV. (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2011/0411/01labmar.cfm (finding 
warmer temperatures, lower concentrations of manufacturing employment, and 
higher household incomes explain the population growth in fastest-growing cities like 
Raleigh, Las Vegas, and Austin) 
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2011 shows that growth rates in larger cities are outpacing their 
suburban counterparts in metropolitan areas across the country.69 
A certain minimum density is required to support mass transit, 
walkable commercial centers, and the kinds of vibrant mixed-use 
communities that reflect modern design principles.  While this, today, 
may represent a modest share of consumer preferences,70 it is hardly 
farfetched to think that more and more people, especially younger 
people, will actively seek more dense housing options in cities, or in 
suburban locales embracing modern urban design principles.71 
Where that seeking occurs, large-lot zoning is likely to suppress, 
not enhance property values.  If the sprawling development patterns 
that large-lot zoning generates become undesirable, such zoning will 
put downward pressure on property values and actually increase 
affordability.  Even though the effect of the zoning is to reduce the 
supply of developable land, it does so by necessitating a form of 
development that people may not want.  Unable to satisfy consumer 
preferences, prices are likely to decrease, despite the restriction in 
supply (or, more likely, the zoning will change).72  Indeed, in some 
cities, the strong desire for density among younger families has driven 
up urban housing prices to such an extent that they are now turning 
to lower cost housing options in the suburbs—a phenomenon that 
turns the suburbanization patterns of the 1950s and 60s on its head.73  
 
 69. See generally Nate Berg, Urban Versus Suburban Growth in U.S. Metros, 
ATLANTIC CITIES (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/ 
2012/06/urban-or-suburban-growth-us-metros/2419. 
 70. See David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclass in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, 
and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. LAW. 787, 787–788 (2009) (explaining that the 
“great majority of middle and upper-class Americans continue to live on the outskirts 
of the center-cities and even more so in the surrounding suburbs,” while “the poor 
and working classes continue to live in the older, postindustrial center-cities” despite 
changing preferences for urban living). 
 71. See Alex Williams, Creating Hipsturbia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, at ST1. 
 72. A similar story can be told regarding bedroom requirements. Local 
governments would sometimes limit the number of bedrooms per unit in residential 
development with the goal both of reducing the number of children, in absolute 
terms, but also as a proxy for lower-income households. See, e.g., Span, supra note 
12, at 19.  Yet if wealthier households increasingly have a preference for larger 
families, bedroom requirements could have the unintended consequence of 
depressing property values.  We thank Dana Brakman-Reiser for this suggestion.  
For a similar dynamic, consider rental restrictions imposed by homeowners 
associations, which—contrary to traditional assumptions—may drive down property 
values in a strong rental market. See Brian Eason, Homeowners Associations Clamp 
Down on Rentals, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/business/2012/10/04/homeowners-oppose-rentals/1614229/. 
 73. See Williams, supra note 71. 
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Moreover, to attract younger families leaving the urban core, many 
suburbs are encouraging high-density development to mirror the 
urban form.74 
There is still a sense in which zoning is inherently exclusionary by 
design, but not simply because it reduces supply.  Instead, the goal of 
most zoning, fundamentally, is to preserve or increase property 
values.75  Sometimes this comes from large-lot zoning, but sometimes 
it comes from fostering or even requiring more dense mixed-use 
development.76 
This seems obvious enough, but it generates important implications 
that are often missed.  Opponents of exclusionary zoning frequently 
object to large-lot zoning and push for greater density.  But 
municipalities that embrace greater density are almost certainly 
betting that greater density will increase not decrease property values 
and will actually limit affordability.  Greater density by itself will not 
necessarily result in lower property values if the new development 
actually satisfies high-end consumers’ preferences.77  It also means 
that the urban core is becoming a new location for exclusionary 
zoning—or at least neighborhoods within the urban core.78  Yet the 
form of the zoning is different—it may not be large-lot requirements, 
but instead other regulatory controls that limit congestion or sub-
local services.  Zoning can be exclusionary even if it embraces 
 
 74. Id. (“[T]o ward off the nagging sense that a move to the suburbs is tantamount 
to becoming like one’s parents, this urban-zen generation is seeking out palatable 
alternatives—culturally attuned, sprawl-free New York river towns like Hastings, 
Dobbs Ferry, Irvington and Tarrytown—and importing the trappings of a twee 
lifestyle like bearded mixologists, locavore restaurants and antler-laden boutiques.”). 
 75. But see Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in 
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101–21 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden 
eds., 1989) (describing how industrial zoning can be intentionally designed to reduce 
property values and displace minority communities). 
 76. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: 
Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority 
Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 45 (2002) (explaining how 
smart growth and New Urbanism can lead to “the intensification of ethnic 
separation,” “gentrification and displacement of the poor”). 
 77. See, e.g., Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and 
Affordable Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
(Anthony Downs ed., 2004). 
 78. See James A. Kushner, Affordable Housing as Infrastructure in the Time of 
Global Warming, 42/43 URB. LAW. 179, 206 (2011) (noting the success of transit-
oriented development has led to “secondary development [which] has the effect of 
gentrifying the neighborhood as rents and property sales prices escalate to reflect the 
new markets and result[s] in the displacement of lower income neighborhood 
residents”). 
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density, so long as the resulting housing values capitalize the value of 
sub-local amenities. 
Consider transit-oriented development (TOD).79  Many opponents 
of exclusionary zoning decry development patterns that require 
residents to rely on cars.80  They point out that cars are expensive to 
own and operate, and that the absence of public transportation 
options can effectively exclude lower-income workers from a 
neighborhood.81  But it does not follow that the current push for 
transit-oriented development is necessarily the solution.  If housing 
prices in transit-oriented developments capitalize most or all of the 
transportation savings, then such developments provide little help for 
lower-income households.82  Imagine, for example, that commuting by 
car costs $200 per month on average.  If housing prices in the transit-
oriented development are $200 per month higher to reflect those cost 
savings as well as, perhaps, other less tangible benefits of mass transit, 
then transit-oriented development is not necessarily less exclusionary.  
In fact, recent studies on walkability and TOD suggest that more 
walkable urban areas are commanding higher property values.83 
Increasingly, too, sub-local control over land use can create 
powerful exclusionary forces at the neighborhood level.  The clearest 
example is the relatively new phenomenon of the community 
conservation district.84  It amounts to a kind of historic preservation 
district without the need for historical significance, and it provides the 
community with a layer of sub-local control over land use decisions.  
This additional layer almost inevitably drives up the cost of 
development because it imposes another regulatory hurdle, and 
provides a particular vehicle for expressing sub-local NIMBY-ism.  
 
 79. Robert H. Freilich, The Land-Use Implications of Transit-Oriented 
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and 
Urban Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 550 (1998) (setting out key characteristics 
associated with TOD, including density to support mass-transit and more walkable 
neighborhoods). 
 80. See, e.g., TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., TRANSPORTATION 
AFFORDABILITY: EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES 3 (2013). 
 81. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 28, at 905. 
 82. See, e.g., BARBARA J. LIPMAN, CENTER FOR HOUS. POLICY, A HEAVY LOAD: 
THE COMBINED HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION BURDENS OF WORKING FAMILIES 
13, 17 (2006). 
 83. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER & MARIELA ALFONZO, BROOKINGS 
INST., WALK THIS WAY: THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF WALKABLE PLACES IN 
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2012); Christopher B. Leinberger, Now 
Coveted: A Walkable, Convenient Place, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, at SR6. 
 84. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see Fischel, supra note 41. 
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Although the phenomenon is sufficiently new that studies have not 
yet appeared examining the effect of community preservation districts 
on affordability, it is at least easy to guess which direction the 
pressures will go. 
Neighborhoods can also capture significant control over sub-local 
revenue through TIFs or special assessments, which can fund 
neighborhood improvements and infrastructure development with 
tightly concentrated benefits that do not extend to lower-valued parts 
of the municipality.  The same kind of exclusion can also occur with 
school district line drawing.85  In short, neighborhood exclusion is 
common and can take many forms. 
At the regional level, exclusion consists primarily of the aggregate 
effects of local exclusion.86  By and large, there is no regional 
government that enacts exclusionary land use controls.87  Instead, 
regional exclusion occurs when too many separate local governments 
within a particular region enact exclusionary measures. 
There is, however, a broader effect at work here that makes 
regional exclusion more than simply the sum of the effects of local 
governments’ uncoordinated actions.  The problem relates back to 
the dynamics around traditional inter-local exclusionary zoning.  In a 
region facing significant housing demand, especially demand for 
affordable housing, exclusionary zoning by one local government 
imposes a kind of region-wide inter-local externality, forcing other 
local governments to bear a disproportionate share of lower-income 
households.  Importantly, though, that effect is not static.  Instead, the 
more local governments within a region adopt exclusionary measures, 
the more pressure it puts on the remaining local governments to do 
the same. 
Moreover, the more common exclusionary regulations become 
within a region, the more knowledge local officials are likely to have 
about the form that such regulations take.  Intra-regional information 
networks between local planners and zoning officials will often lead 
to a kind of regional convergence in the content of local zoning 
 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
 86. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 11, at 148–49 (noting the cumulative effects of 
exclusionary zoning at the local level). 
 87. Francois Vigier et al., Ad Hoc Regionalism: Managing Growth Through 
Spatial Planning—Learning from the American Experience, J. CROSS BORDER STUD. 
IRELAND , Mar. 2006, at 63, available at http://www.crossborder.ie/pubs/journal1.pdf 
(“[T]he management of spatial growth through zoning and other development 
controls is the responsibility of local governments.”). 
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codes.88  This convergence is not a coincidence, and the result, again, 
can be widespread exclusion at the regional level.  As exclusion 
afflicts an entire region, the problem again surfaces in a range of 
landscapes.  Cities that are already supplying a sizeable amount of 
affordable housing may nevertheless be contributing to a region-wide 
shortage of affordable housing in an area rich with employment 
opportunities.89  The new frontiers of exclusion call for rethinking 
conventional remedies for exclusionary zoning. 
III.  REJECTING AN ORDINANCE-CENTRIC FOCUS 
Concerns about exclusionary zoning are not primarily about 
density limits, nor even about affordability in the abstract.  Rather, 
the central worry is about the extent to which land use controls at any 
scale prevent lower-income households from accessing economic 
opportunity and quality public services.  Zoning, when too restrictive, 
forces people to disgorge most or all of the value of living in a place in 
the form of higher housing prices.  That is not to say that everyone 
should be able to live everywhere they want, but it is to say that if 
exclusion is too widespread at any level—regional, local, or sub-
local—it can exacerbate wealth and income inequality, and make the 
distribution of public services even more inequitable. 
The question of when zoning becomes too restrictive is entirely 
dependent on the underlying market context.  Consider the 
conventional story of suburban exclusion detailed in Part I.  
Exclusionary zoning was originally about post-war inner-ring suburbs 
enacting large-lot zoning, density limits, and regulatory requirements 
increasing the costs of development.90  These early post-war suburbs 
were therefore largely unaffordable to the poor.  Fast forward thirty 
years, however, and affordability of housing options is not high on the 
list of problems facing some of these same inner-ring suburbs.91 
 
 88. Id. (presenting examples of ad-hoc regionalism, including “voluntary 
association[s]” of neighboring local governments “facing common growth 
management issues”). 
 89. See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 35, at 22 (“The U.S. is increasingly 
characterized by segregation along economic dimensions, with limited access for most 
workers to America’s most productive cities.”). 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 9–15. 
 91. See, e.g., Sugie Lee & Nancy Green Leigh, The Role of Inner-Ring Suburbs in 
Metropolitan Smart Growth Strategies, 19 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 330, 330 (2005) 
(“Current metropolitan trends of spatial decentralization may serve to increase the 
economic vulnerability of skipped-over inner ring suburbs since they have neither the 
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In fact, leapfrogging development, in which the affluent continue to 
push farther and farther outside of urban centers, has led to 
disinvestment from some of these early inner-ring suburbs.92  Even if 
zoning ordinances continue to impose minimum lot sizes and exclude 
forms of multi-family development, housing prices are low enough 
that they are accessible even to lower-income families.  In suburbs 
surrounding Detroit, to take the most extreme example, people can 
buy houses for as little as $2500—which is a fraction of the roughly 
$10,000 cost of demolishing a house—but the decrepitude of the 
neighborhoods and the lack of services means that few people want to 
move.93  The impact of the zoning ordinance has therefore changed 
over time.  Even widespread use of characteristically exclusionary 
devices will not make housing unaffordable in places people do not 
want to live.  Traditionally exclusionary provisions in a zoning 
ordinance do not make the ordinance exclusionary in fact. 
The point is a general one.  In places without meaningful 
development pressure, exclusionary zoning ordinances have little 
effect on affordability.  Many rural municipalities have extremely 
large lot zoning, often justified on environmental grounds, and they 
are not unaffordable as a result.  In the absence of meaningful 
development demand, density restrictions are likely to have little 
effect. 
But dense urban neighborhoods can also be exclusionary if they 
are not dense enough.  Zoning that permits dense, multi-family 
housing is often not on the radar as potentially exclusionary, but it 
can be.  Height limits, or limits on the floor-area-ratio,94 can still 
significantly constrain supply relative to the given demand, even in 
neighborhoods with truly urban density.95  And simply adding density 
may not make a dent in exclusionary outcomes if that new 
 
centrality and attraction of the central cities nor the attractive residential 
environments of outer ring suburbs at the metropolitan fringe.”). 
 92. Id.; see also Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban 
Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006) (noting how 
inner-ring suburbs struggle with shrinking tax bases as residents opt for newer areas). 
 93. See The Cost of Demolishing a House in Detroit, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 29, 
2013), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/cost-demolishing-home-
detroit. 
 94. This is a measure of density employed in New York City, referred to as FAR. 
N.Y.C., N.Y. Zoning Resolution, art. I § 12-10 (2013), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.shtml.  For a discussion on the 
mechanics of FAR, see ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 48, at 3–4. 
 95. ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 48, at 7 (explaining how downzonings “may 
limit owners’ ability to capitalize on the development capacity of their lots”). 
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development capacity is not directed at affordable housing 
development.  Again, the underlying market context is determinative 
when assessing the problem of exclusionary zoning and the proper 
remedy. 
More provocatively, increased density can even increase property 
values if it better satisfies consumer preferences.  This is not 
farfetched.  Greater density—at least in certain contexts—can lead to 
greater availability of services, from public transportation, to Whole 
Foods and Starbucks.  These familiar incidents of gentrification mean 
that greater density can decrease affordability, depending on local 
market conditions.96 
Nevertheless, many continue to identify exclusionary zoning 
exclusively by reference to specific zoning provisions abstracted from 
market pressures on the ground.97  Moreover, if the market is ever 
considered in the context of exclusionary zoning challenges, it is 
typically confined to the affordable housing needs in and around the 
municipality, rather than the dearth of affordable housing in an entire 
region, or the unmet affordable housing needs at the neighborhood 
scale. 
Courts, in particular, tend to be dismissive of the market forces 
operating at various scales when analyzing whether an ordinance is 
impermissibly exclusionary.98  Even courts that have imposed fair 
share obligations on municipalities have not done so in response to 
inter-regional concerns, but only inter-local ones.99  Similarly, courts 
rarely touch upon the possibility of sub-local exclusion, and its 
consequent denial of a meaningful opportunity to access the quality 
public services offered within a municipality’s bounds.  But as the 
above discussion has underscored, sub-local and regional forms of 
exclusion pose many of the same concerns as the more traditional 
 
 96. ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DISPLACEMENT, 
DEVELOPMENT WITH DIVERSITY 11-39 (2009), available at 
http://www.bayareavision.org/initiatives/dwd-final.pdf (reviewing TOD projects in 
California’s Bay Area communities and reporting that “most new TOD projects 
serve upper-income households who can pay a premium to live in them”). 
 97. See infra text accompanying notes 98–121. 
 98. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 577 P.2d 473 (Cal. 
1975). 
 99. Some courts have, however, highlighted the widespread adoption of 
residential restrictions across states to limit the migration of low-income workers.  
For instance, the dissent in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore noted 
that “[t]he State of California made an abortive effort toward exclusivity back in the 
1930s as part of a scheme to stem the influx of poor migrants from the dust bowl 
states of the southwest.” 577 P.2d 473, 494 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
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forms of exclusion at the local level.100  Courts should therefore adopt 
more flexible spatial frames when evaluating how a particular 
ordinance interacts with the market. 
This is not to say that courts have been completely inattentive to 
issues of scale in exclusionary zoning challenges.  Courts have 
expanded their spatial frame slightly to consider the problems of 
inter-local externalities and region-wide cumulative impacts.101  And 
this expanded view has uncovered exclusion that would have almost 
certainly been missed from a purely localized analysis.102  An example 
of this can be found in the divergent approaches to spatial framing 
that the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit took in 
Construction Industry Ass’n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma.103  The 
ordinance there had limited the number of multi-family units that 
could be developed over a five-year period in Petaluma, a suburb 
outside of San Francisco.104  But, interestingly, the ordinance allowed 
for some multi-family development where none had previously been 
allowed.105  The ordinance also set aside a portion of that new 
development for lower-income households.  Testimony at trial 
indicated that if Petaluma’s limits on multi-family housing were to be 
adopted more widely across the San Francisco region, a serious 
shortfall in housing would result.106  Furthermore, this burden would 
fall disproportionately on lower income households within the region, 
unable to access affordable units.107 
The District Court expanded its spatial frame to consider the inter-
local externalities and the cumulative impacts that such an ordinance 
 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 77–89. 
 101. See, e.g., Berenson v. New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975) (reviewing 
a municipal zoning ordinance in terms of local impacts and the needs and 
requirements of the larger region). 
 102. However, widening the spatial frame does not always signify a willingness to 
find an ordinance impermissibly exclusionary. See Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 
503 F.2d. 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that availability of affordable housing 
within the region defeated a challenge to the ordinance as exclusionary); Duffcon 
Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 351 (N.J. 1949) (holding that a 
bar to industrial development was permissible since there was suitable land within 
the region for new industrial development). 
 103. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev’d, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 104. 522 F.2d at 901. 
 105. Id. at 908 n.16. 
 106. Id. at 902. 
 107. Id.  The ordinance was expected to operate to the detriment of the region’s 
low-income population, even though the impact of the ordinance was to “increase[] 
the availability of multi-family units (owner-occupied and rental units) and low-
income units which were rarely constructed in the pre-Plan days.” Id. 
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might impose, and concluded that the limits on multi-family 
development were impermissibly exclusionary.108  However, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the District Court’s broader spatial framing of the 
ordinance, instead choosing to focus strictly on the ordinance’s impact 
within the city lines.109  This spatially-constrained framing led the 
Ninth Circuit to conclude that the ordinance could actually be 
characterized as inclusionary, merely because it provided for some 
new and affordable multi-family housing development.110 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach improperly disassociates Petaluma’s 
ordinance from the underlying market context.  Whether Petaluma’s 
ordinance is inclusionary or exclusionary depends entirely on the 
market for affordable housing at various scales, as influenced by the 
distribution of higher-wage jobs and public services.  Even an 
ordinance that takes affirmative steps to address affordable housing 
needs may not go far enough to root out exclusion at the regional 
scale. 
Moreover, the ordinance should not be characterized without 
considering where housing is likely to be developed at the sub-local 
level.  Notably, there was some discussion in the Ninth Circuit 
opinion about how Petaluma’s ordinance planned for a somewhat 
even distribution of multi-family housing across the city so as not to 
cluster the new development in one isolated neighborhood.111  But 
despite this acknowledgement, there was no express discussion of 
sub-local exclusionary dynamics or the possibility of inequitable 
distribution of municipal services.112 
The swift characterization of ordinances without respect to 
background market conditions is certainly not unique to the Petaluma 
decision.  In Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,113 the 
 
 108.  375 F. Supp. at 584–88. 
 109. 522 F.2d at 908 (reasoning that the question of regional impacts was better left 
for the state legislature).  However, the expectation of a state legislative response is 
optimistic at best and misguided at worst.   The state may be unlikely to respond to a 
flourishing region that is passing off affordable housing burdens to neighboring areas.  
In fact, states may have a strong incentive to silently shift affordable housing burdens 
across state lines.  This inter-state externality problem suggests that some forms of 
residential exclusion may require intervention at the national level.  And at that 
scale, it is open to debate whether Congress or federal courts are best positioned to 
rule on the exclusionary impacts of a land use regulation; the tables do not tip so 
clearly against the courts. 
 110. Id. at 908 n.16. 
 111. Id. at 901. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 577 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1975). 
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California Supreme Court fell into precisely the same trap as the 
Ninth Circuit, characterizing an ordinance based on the content of its 
provisions abstracted from market conditions. 
The city of Livermore had flatly banned all new development for 
an undetermined amount of time, without drawing the familiar 
distinctions between expensive and affordable housing that are 
conventionally characterized as exclusionary ordinances.114  Because 
Livermore’s plan did not single out affordable housing development, 
the court rejected any reliance on exclusionary zoning cases that 
involved large lot zoning or other density limitations.115  The 
California Supreme Court stressed how the impacts of an ordinance 
are not coextensive with municipal boundaries, but in nearly the same 
breath distinguished between ordinances that have more direct 
wealth-based implications and those that do not.116  The irony is that 
with a regional lens, this may be a distinction without difference.  An 
outright restriction on all new development could theoretically be far 
more exclusionary for lower-income households in a region that 
sorely needs more housing than an ordinance that overtly favors 
single-family homes in an area where affordable housing demand is 
weaker. 
The larger point is that spatial framing can shed light on exclusion 
at the regional or sub-local level, or it can obscure it when analysis is 
confined to a local scale.  A purely local focus only tends to capture 
residential exclusion between municipalities.  This observation is not 
entirely new in the context of inter-local externalities.  In 1969, 
Professor Lawrence Sager observed the importance of looking 
beyond the municipality for “an intelligent appraisal of the social 
harm deriving from exclusionary zoning.”117  Indeed, a slight 
broadening of the frame to consider inter-local externalities displays 
the possibility of wholesale exclusion from a particular region.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Mount Laurel is perhaps the 
most famous for broadening its spatial frame in precisely this 
fashion.118 
 
 114. Id. at 484. 
 115. Id. at 485. 
 116. Id. at 487. 
 117. Sager, supra note 15, at 793. 
 118. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 727–28 
(N.J. 1975) (“[T]he universal and constant need for such [low- and moderate income] 
housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare 
which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond 
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While regional framing is one step closer to a more careful 
exposition on the exclusionary zoning problem, courts continue to 
cast remedies to exclusionary zoning in static terms and without the 
right level of spatial nuance.  An article published in this journal by 
James Quinn in 1975 observed that even in cases where courts held 
that municipalities have a legal obligation to provide their fair share 
of affordable housing within a region, the concept of demand was not 
expressed with any precision.119  Quinn referenced the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision in Appeal of Girsh,120 where the court’s 
assessment of demand was based again on a purely localized measure: 
whether there was a developer that wanted to pursue an affordable 
housing project within the municipality.121 
Although the Girsh court was attentive to how local ordinances can 
frustrate regional migration patterns, its assessment of demand failed 
to account for regional market conditions that might make affordable 
housing development pressing, even without a developer that stands 
ready to construct low-cost multi-family housing in the municipality.  
Likewise, the demand assessment does not account for the prospect 
of developers ghettoizing lower-income households by placing all new 
development on the edge of a municipality.  A developer may want to 
build on a particular block, but that new apartment project might do 
little to address the affordable housing problems facing lower-income 
households at the sub-local level, and in fact, it might exacerbate sub-
local residential exclusion. 
Ultimately, then, it is important for courts and litigants to 
recognize that the terms of an ordinance, standing alone, do not tell 
the full story of exclusion.  In one context, widespread density 
restrictions may be making an entire region cost-prohibitive.  In 
another, it may be dense development patterns that impose 
exclusionary pressures sub-locally.  Therefore, courts need to break 
away from longstanding conceptions of an ordinance’s terms; the 
terms should no longer serve as the benchmark for residential 
exclusion. 
Instead, judicial interventions should involve a careful examination 
of an ordinance’s interaction with the market at various geographical 
scales.  Without thoughtful spatial framing, courts will likely miss 
 
their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the 
particular municipality.”). 
 119. Quinn, supra note 11, at 159. 
 120. 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970). 
 121. Id. at 399. 
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exclusion at the regional and sub-local level, which is working 
alongside local exclusion to deny lower-income households access to 
higher-income producing regions, and quality public services.  A 
move away from ordinance-centric reasoning will make judicial 
interventions more responsive to all forms of residential exclusion, 
and more attentive to the actual needs of lower-income households 
that suffer at the hand of such exclusion at regional, local and sub-
local scales. 
CONCLUSION 
 Traditionally, exclusionary zoning has been discussed and 
analyzed as a problem of inter-local externalities.  Yet a look at 
exclusion from the perspective of lower-income households reveals 
that the problem replicates itself across three geographical scales: 
regional, local, and sub-local.  As the value of high-paying jobs at the 
regional scale, or public goods at the sub-local scale are more fully 
capitalized into property values, lower-income households can no 
longer take the most fundamental steps towards economic 
empowerment.  Courts and commentators must therefore look 
beyond the content of the ordinance to uncover the extent to which 
land use controls are operating across geographical scales to the 
detriment of lower-income households. 
The new frontiers of exclusion reinforce the importance of 
geographical scale.  Courts merely looking at conventional tools of 
exclusion may mistake density as a remedy for exclusionary zoning.  
There is a renewed interest in urban living, which means that the 
growing popularity of density, in the form of New Urbanist or TOD 
developments, may yield exclusionary outcomes.  A consideration of 
sub-local and regional exclusion reveals the myriad ways that 
municipal decision-making and market forces drive up housing costs 
and problematically inhibit the upward mobility of lower-income 
households. 
